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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966

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FOREWORD

Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966, the second of OCI's intelligence studies to deal with a free world Communist party, should be read in conjunction with Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Venezuelan Communist Party, 1958 - MID-1965, published in late 1965. As a category, the OCI intelligence studies are aimed at situations where study and analysis in some depth seem likely to shed new light on long-standing US security problems, to give timely warning about an emerging problem, or to assist the policy maker in considering ways of coping with any such problems. These research papers appear on no definite schedule but rather as a suitable subject happens to coincide with the availability of the special manpower resources required.

Assistance in the preparation of this paper has been received from various components of the Directorate of Intelligence, notably the Research Staff. It has been informally coordinated with the Office of National Estimates. Comments should be directed to the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The years 1957-1966 offer a special opportunity to study foreign and domestic influences on the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) because the period covers both the rise of the Sino-Soviet dispute and an era when the chief question for the party domestically was whether a policy of violence or of orthodox political activity--the via armada or the via pacifica--provided the most promising road to power. With the overthrow of dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in May 1957, the PCC found itself in circumstances seemingly conducive to growth. Like its fellow Communist party in Venezuela (PCV) the following year, it regained legality after a prolonged period of suppression; it enjoyed a reputation of consistent opposition to the despised dictatorship; and it faced bright prospects of advancing its national political status through orthodox political activity. In August 1966 the party, although still legal, was politically ostracized--regarded generally as obstructive at best and subversive at worst. Its national organization was largely intact and retained at least the nominal backing of the principal Communist rural and paramilitary forces; but a pro-Peking faction had formally broken away in 1964, and much of the party's youth following had been drained away to this and other "ultraleft" factions advocating the via armada.

After regaining legal status in 1957, the PCC had firmly adhered to a program which placed primary emphasis on the via pacifica or mass struggle. The party refused to alter this "soft line" in its fundamentals, despite its long and pragmatic experience with guerrilla warfare and other rural violence in Colombia and despite its influence over a number of active paramilitary forces in the countryside. The party did make some adjustments after 1964 to enhance the role of the "armed struggle" in Colombia in an attempt to answer the criticism of the "ultraleft," assume a more militant facade, and undercut the dissidence within its own ranks. These modifications, which gave a stronger endorsement of the Communist-influenced paramilitary bands, were probably more a

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matter of shrewd semantics than a departure from the via pacifica.

The Communist main line of action throughout this period was toward the development of a "national patriotic front" in opposition to the National Front coalition government under which the traditional Liberal and Conservative Parties shared equally and exclusively in all elective and appointive offices. Communist success in undermining this "constitutionalized" arrangement required that the party concentrate its resources and those of its pro-Communist allies in support of the strong but minority dissident faction of the Liberals--the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL). This defector organization was just as determined after 1960 to disrupt the National Front as were the Communists. This projected PCC-MRL alliance failed, however, because the moderate majority faction of the MRL increasingly shunned overt cooperation with the Communists, and the old guard Communist leaders seemed to lack the flexibility and imagination to demonstrate to the skeptical "ultraleft" elements inside and outside the party the "correctness" and efficacy of the via pacifica as a policy. The secession of the hard-liners in 1964 to form a pro-Peking rival party (the PCC-ML) contrasts with the experience of the Venezuelan Communist party which held together through 1965.

The foreign influences on the party--essentially the same as those bearing upon the PCV--were inseparable from the domestic conflict over the via pacifica versus the via armada. The example of the Cuban revolution and Cuban stimulation of the "ultraleft" were partly responsible for the hard-liners' attack on the PCC's via pacifica line, though Colombian public opinion was less stirred by the Cuban example than opinion in Venezuela. Though both the PCC and the PCV were Moscow oriented, the Colombians gave the USSR their full support in the Sino-Soviet dispute while the Venezuelans sought to avoid the issue under the guise of neutralism. Moscow gave firm backing to the PCC's program, including the attitude toward guerrilla warfare; Moscow could also be credited with substantial indirect assistance to the PCC when Castro agreed, at the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist

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parties in late 1964, to coordinate his subversive efforts in the hemisphere through orthodox party channels. Peking's influence, on the other hand, seems to have consisted of little more than providing ideological support for the Colombian hard-liners.

No precise and definitive assessment is now possible as to the relative weights of the foreign and domestic influences on the PCC over this nine-year period, but it certainly seems to have been domestic factors which were mainly responsible for the principal development in party policy during 1966. This was a tendency, reflected in the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress and elsewhere, to give additional emphasis to the policy of the via armada in an apparent effort to recapture the leadership of the extreme left.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to identify and evaluate the principal forces influencing the course of the Colombian Communist Party during the period from the fall of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship in May 1957 to the end of the Valencia administration in August 1966. With this aim in view, the paper first examines the impact of domestic political events on the program of the PCC and then the relevant developments in international Communism.

In this examination it is useful to compare the PCC's experience with that of the Communist Party in adjacent Venezuela (the PCV) during the years which followed the ouster of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in January 1958.* Both parties emerged with legal status after a protracted period of suppression under authoritarian rule--a suppression much more severe in Venezuela, however, than in Colombia. Perhaps until 1962 both parties had relatively bright prospects for improving their positions in national politics through ordinary political methods; the Communist prospects in Venezuela seemed especially bright, partly because the prevailing political climate was more radical there than in Colombia. But opportunities for Communist exploitation were plentiful in both countries, as coalition regimes--with their inherent weaknesses--struggled to restore representative, constitutional government and cope with various economic and social problems left unsolved by the ousted dictators.

The PCC and the PCV were each torn with internal dissension over the issue of whether to pursue power primarily by overt political action (variously termed, in Latin American Communist parlance, the mass struggle, <u>via parliamentaria</u> and <u>via pacifica</u>) or by revolution (the armed struggle or <u>lucha armada</u>). On this critical issue neither party followed a policy of complete consistency. A

**See FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY, 1958 - MID-1965, Intelligence Study by the Directorate of Intelligence, 6 December 1965 (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 58 pages.*

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variety of pressures and influences gradually led the PCV to choose the armed struggle, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare after 1963, even though it had little experience in this tactic or capability for carrying it out. On the other hand, the Colombian party, in spite of its extensive experience and substantial assets for conducting guerrilla warfare, generally held to the via pacifica as the primary way to power.

Both parties were traditionally oriented toward Moscow, yet they chose divergent paths in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Colombian party gave solid support to the USSR and the PCV took a neutral stand in an effort to reduce conflicts between hard-liners and soft-liners within the party. Each party was subject to strong pressures to follow Cuba's revolutionary example--pressures of both a direct and an indirect nature, since Castro's appeal to left-wing opinion in Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent in Colombia, was one of the political facts of life in those countries.

The Colombian party formally split in early 1964, largely as a result of differences over domestic strategy and tactics, and, to a lesser degree, over its stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The PCV maintained a facade of unity through 1965.

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II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL POLITICS

The position of the PCC has been much affected by Colombia's traditional two-party system of government (now modified by the agreement for a bipartisan National Front) and by the extensive rural violence which has troubled the country for nearly two decades.

Since its formal establishment in 1930, the PCC has been severely limited in influence by this two-party system, under which Liberals and Conservatives have monopolized power by constitutional procedures throughout most of the 20th century. The nominal membership of these two parties has included the vast majority of the people cutting across all class and regional lines of the country; each, in this sense, has been a truly national party. Liberal and Conservative affiliation, which is generally "inherited" rather than based on clear ideological conviction, approaches a kind of religious fervor, sometimes transcending loyalty to the nation. The political monopoly of the Liberal and Conservative parties explains in part the weakness of the Communist Party and other minor parties.

Partisan attitudes caused a gradual breakdown of constitutional government in the late 1940s, marked particularly by the serious rioting in the capital in 1948 (the Bogotazo) and the widespread rural strife known as la violencia which began after that date and still continues, although greatly diminished since then. This highly complex phenomenon of rural unrest cannot be attributed to any single cause; its geographical centers have been continually shifting and much of the guerrilla activity has always been apolitical and little more than organized banditry. During the years 1948-1953 rural violence was largely motivated by the deep hostility between the Liberal and Conservative parties, including family and clan vendettas. In subsequent years, the causes have been primarily economic and social, including robbery, land seizure,

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and protection racketeering among the peasantry. Banditry has become a full or part-time way of life for many of the elements participating. However, political motives are still present, and are seen especially in conflicts among local caudillos to maintain their spheres of dominance and in their determined efforts to block the re-establishment of departmental and central government authority.

A number of peasant leaders in various parts of the country have been pro-Communist and in varying degrees have followed the guidance of the party. In some rural enclaves, such as Viota and Sumapaz, Communist leaders have exercised direct control. Some of the largest active or partly active guerrilla bands have been under the sway of Communist chieftains or tended to adhere to the party line. In recent years, the party's role in violence has been publicized by government counterinsurgency campaigns which have concentrated to a large degree on the centers of Communist rural paramilitary strength. The PCC, however, although consistently attempting to exploit la violencia, has not been a key factor in promoting violence.

The PCC was outlawed during most of the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) but regained its legal status under the provisional military junta (1957-1958) and seemed prepared to exploit the social, economic and political problems confronting the subsequent elected government--and in particular the weaknesses inherent in the newly devised National Front.

Under this arrangement, the two traditional parties agreed to share equally and exclusively all elective and appointive offices at local and national levels for sixteen years; that is, for four presidential terms beginning in 1958 and ending in 1974. The presidency was to be alternated between them every four years. No one could hold any governmental appointment without some acceptable version of the Liberal or Conservative label. At the conclusion of this agreement, which was incorporated into the Constitution, the parties presumably were to resume normal competition for political offices.

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The National Front was born of a recognition by both the Liberals and the Conservatives that their deep-rooted animosities had to be bridled; that they had to live together peacefully in order to establish an effective, stable administration and avoid another dose of dictatorial rule. In many respects it appeared to be a plausible method for re-establishing representative government, restoring economic and political stability, and implementing a bipartisan program to reduce rural violence.

All other parties were frozen out by the National Front agreement. The Communists, because of the generally right-center orientation of the two major parties, were reduced largely to working with radical minority elements of the Liberal Party--including students and organized urban labor--to develop alliances which might exert a significant influence on national politics. The Communists, nevertheless, derived certain opportunities from inherent weaknesses in the National Front. The fundamental defect was that the Liberal Party clearly commanded a majority of the electorate, and many Liberal elements were reluctant or openly opposed to a self-denying bipartisan peace treaty. Moreover, the divisions existing within each of the traditional parties placed additional strains on the arrangement which the Communists were in a position to exploit. The PCC apparently recognized that dissolution of the National Front might lead to military intervention, but thought there was a good chance that it would produce a new order in which Communists could participate directly and play a greater role in national politics.

The National Front's weaknesses were apparent even before the inauguration of the first Liberal administration under Alberto Lleras Camargo in 1958, and in early 1960 the liberal Party split. Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, son of a former president, established a strong, minority Liberal organization which eventually adopted the name Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL). At least until late 1962 it was strongly pro-Castro in its leadership, anti-US in many of its policies, favorable toward cooperation with the PCC in elections and other political activity, and adamantly opposed to the

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National Front. These policies, which paralleled those of the PCC, suggested the makings of a powerful "national patriotic opposition front." At the height of its power in 1962, the MRL, with the backing of the Communist and pro-Communist vote, was emerging as a major challenge to the viability of the government coalition. In this year, Lopez ran as a protest presidential candidate against Conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia and won almost one fourth of the total popular vote. In addition, the MRL substantially increased its representation in Congress, many of these legislative seats being filled by Communists and pro-Communists under the camouflage of the MRL label.

ALFONSO LOPEZ MICHELSEN

Leader of the MRL, the minority Liberal Party faction which cooperated with the PCC.

Factionalism in the Conservative Party proved to be an even greater limitation on the effectiveness of the National Front. The Conservatives, traditionally hostile toward any kind of cooperation with the Communists, were even more seriously divided than the Liberals. Actually, several autonomous organizations known as the Ospinistas, Laureanistas, Alzatistas, and Leyvistas--titles derived from the names of the principal leaders--were included under the Conservative label. After Rojas Pinilla returned to the country (1958) and organized his followers under the National Popular Alliance (ANP) in 1961, still another so-called "Conservative" faction entered the electoral lists.

PCC Policies and Programs, 1957-1966

Throughout its 35-year history, the PCC has been strongly oriented toward Moscow and responsive to the directives of the CPSU and the twists in Soviet international

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policies. The old guard leaders were products of the Stalin era but had little difficulty in giving lip service to denunciation of the "cult of personality" under the de-Stalinization program, while in fact carrying on party business as in the days of Stalin. Gilberto Vieira White and his group had seized control of the party in 1947 from the then Secretary General, Augusto Duran--who, after his expulsion by Vieira, formed a splinter party which has persisted in the region around Barranquilla but has never posed a serious threat to Vieira's leadership. As Secretary General, Vieira was virtually unchallenged in his dictatorial control over party policy at least until the Sino-Soviet dispute became public and the Castro revolutionary example began to have an impact on Colombian radicals.

A shrewd interpreter of the Colombian political scene, Vieira developed skill over the years as a party bureaucrat and manipulator of the Central Committee. In contrast to the party situation in neighboring Venezuela, Vieira's control faced no serious competition from younger dynamic leaders possessed of strong followings within the party ranks and inclined toward experimentation with radical programs. Moreover, Vieira managed to avoid exile or imprisonment, either of which would have paved the way for others to pre-empt his position. His long tenure thus provided continuity of programs, but meant conservatism and even stagnation. The clandestine operations of the party had been limited and ineffective during the regime of Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) and even the Communist guerrillas were used only to maintain the status quo in the areas where the party exercised strong influence, such as Viota, Sumapaz and northern Tolima. The objective of retaining legality was evidently a prime consideration in party policy.

GILBERTO VIEIRA WHITE

Secretary General of the PCC, 1947-

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In its personal characteristics the CCP leadership had little to attract help from anyone outside the party who might be interested in disrupting the National Front. At least to the Colombian public, the Communist leaders were notably lacking in dynamism, imagination and political opportunism; they seemed content to receive their modest stipends, occasional junkets to the bloc countries, and such limited foreign subsidies and other support as might fall to their lot.

The principal Colombian Communist policy was a firm and unconditional advocacy of the primacy of the via pacifica, or parliamentary struggle. The party did accept the armed struggle under appropriate circumstances in designated local areas, but during the late '50s and early '60s it insisted that the political consciousness of the worker class had not matured to the requisite level for launching a general revolution.

As the principal action for developing the party's mass strength, the PCC has on more than one occasion since 1957 called for the organization of a "great patriotic front of national liberation." At the time the party reacquired legal status in 1957, Vieira insisted that Communists would have to emerge from their cocoon of isolation, cast off their dogmatic orientation, and work with any group opposed to the National Front. At the 9th Congress in 1961, the party identified the MRL as the principal vehicle for this purpose.

On the critical issue of armed struggle the party's statements up to 1965 were ambiguous and essentially semantic modifications of its traditional theme of "self-defense" by the peasant masses where justified by the oppressive actions of the "oligarchic" security forces. In 1965, however, the PCC formulated what it claimed to be a unique policy which it hoped would satisfy those who were clamoring for action and yet not risk the party's legal status. The political resolution of the party's Tenth Congress in January 1966 stated:

> In Colombia there is opening an original revolutionary way, based on the use of all methods

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and forms of mass struggle, combined according to concrete local and general conditions. Peasant guerrilla war is one of the highest forms of mass struggle and only prospers and grows where it is linked with the masses. At present, although peasant guerrilla war is not yet the principal form of struggle it is becoming more important every day.

In this "unique policy," the PCC recognized that "the guerrilla movement forms a part of the combined political situation" and that "its perspective should be analyzed in relation to this over-all situation." The party further asserted that guerrilla action "tends to promote and create certain subjective and indispensable factors for the emergent triumph of the revolutionary situation in Colombia." It defended its ancient policy of self-defense of the rural masses as "correct," and as having produced a "vigorous guerrilla movement wherever the official forces in cooperation with the Yankee military had waged war against the masses in the countryside."

The PCC in National Politics After 1957

When the PCC regained freedom to operate overtly in 1957, its political position and prospects were better than at any time in the past decade, but less favorable than the PCV's in Venezuela when the dictatorship was overthrown there. Unlike their comrades in Venezuela in 1958, the Communists could take no credit for helping overthrow the hated authoritarian regime, and they were excluded from office by the provisions of the National Front.

The party did have substantial support in the organized labor movement, among university students, and in the various intellectual classes. Even among the students, however, the Communist potential was markedly less than in Venezuela, where the university population was concentrated in the strategically located Central University in Caracas. Colombian students, being dispersed among a number of universities in Bogota and in provincial cities, have been more difficult to organize for large-scale demonstrations and

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have been generally less inclined to challenge the government on purely political issues than students in various other Latin American countries.

On the other hand, the party had one asset which was unique among all Latin American Communist organizations: prolonged experience in rural violence (la violencia) and guerrilla warfare, including a knowledge of the problems connected with coordinating scattered paramilitary groups of leftist and Communist orientation. However, not until Castro had demonstrated successfully the application of guerrilla warfare methods in Cuba did this Communist paramilitary strength assume special significance in party eyes.

Despite the many deficiencies in party thinking, the serious domestic problems confronting the National Front and the divisions within that coalition gave the PCC a chance to expand its national influence. In the MRL and the "national democratic front" the Communists had a promising means of exploiting these divisions, and in 1960 they estimated their prospects for disrupting the traditional two-party system in Colombia to be the best in the entire history of the party.

These prospects depended, however, on the maintenance of a basic unity among a number of competing leftist elements. There was some reason for the PCC's optimism until the end of 1962, when serious dissension began to plague the MRL, and various pro-Communist leftist elements began to challenge the PCC's line on the via pacifica. These elements were much influenced by Cuban developments and by Chinese revolutionary ideology (as will be discussed later) and with good reason the Communists publicly blamed the "Chinese party directors"--and privately the "Che Guevara faction" of the Cuban regime--for provoking the attacks on the via pacifica which absorbed the party's attention.

The dissension inside the MRL, partly attributable to the issue of armed struggle and indirectly to foreign influence, was mainly caused by conflicting

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personal ambitions among the leaders. One group, nominally a part of this maverick Liberal organization, was the undisciplined "Youth of the MRL" (JMRL), founded and led by ex-Communist Luis Villar Borda, who was a proponent of lucha armada for Colombia. Other pro-Castro MRL factions included the "hard-line" group of Alvaro Uribe Rueda and the clique of Camilo Aluma in Cali.

But it was Lopez who held the support of the majority of the MRL after 1962. He moderated the party's policies. Among other things, he rejected Cuban-style revolution as applicable to Colombia and muted the party's pro-Castro propaganda output. More important, he shied away from entering into a formal alliance with the PCC--as advocated by some radical elements in the MRL--although he did not eschew informal cooperation with the Communists or reject their electoral support. (His influence on the PCC contrasted with that exerted by the principal ally of the Communists in Venezuela, where the Castroite Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) was more committed to the armed struggle than the PCV itself and pushed the PCV in that direction.) Lopez' position in refusing formal alliance with the PCC did, however, provide the pro-Chinese minority in the PCC with further ground for insisting that the via parliamentaria would never bring the Communists to power in Colombia.

The MRL, which had reached its high point in national influence in the congressional and presidential elections of 1962, fared very badly in the elections of early 1966--reflecting in part its internal dissension. The majority Lopez faction of the MRL therefore seriously considered returning to the regular Liberal party, a move which would strengthen the National Front and the Liberal administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, inaugurated in August 1966. Since the Communist via parliamentaria was directly tied to the destinies of the MRL as an opposition party, the PCC prospects were similarly reduced to a new low by the 1966 election results--a decline which had been under way during the previous two years. The PCC apparently had only limited influence remaining

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among some of the radical cliques of the MRL and their pro-Communist leaders.

Relations with the Leftist Splinter Groups

The Communists' problems were compounded by sterile battles with organizations which should logically have been natural allies in developing the united front tactic against the government. After 1958, a number of radical leftist groups of limited strength were formed in Colombia to promote urban and rural violence. Most of them were inspired by the Castro revolution and the Chinese line on wars of national liberation; their leaders maintained liaison with the Cuban and Chinese governments and probably obtained some financial support in those capitals. Some of these groups were led by apostate Communists --for example, Luis Villar, Alfonso Romero Buj and Pedro Abella Larotta--who, after being expelled from the PCC, had siphoned off many Communist youths and sympathizers to build the new organizations. They also occasionally attempted to recruit among pro-Communist guerrilla bands. The PCC eventually branded most of these groups as "charlatans, false revolutionaries, and ultra-leftists."

The first of these subversive organizations to launch into the armed struggle was the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), initially organized in early 1959 under another name. Cuba supplied training for the key leaders and also some financial aid. Antonio Larrota, one of the founders, had just returned from a long sojourn in Cuba as a revolutionary protege and agent of the Castro regime. Eduardo Aristizabal and such other MOEC leaders as Eduardo Arismendi and Pedro Abella also found encouragement and sponsorship in Havana.

The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) likewise had the blessing of Castro, who sent it funds through Gloria Gaitan and Luis Emiro Valencia. It was organized in early 1962

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by renegade Communists and native Marxists to promote the armed struggle, and tried to absorb all the small revolutionary groups and to enlist some active guerrilla leaders under the FUAR banner. These efforts were largely unproductive, however, and most of the Cuban subsidies appear to have been squandered or to have been appropriated by the less idealistic members. The FUAR dissolved itself in 1965.

Like the MOEC and FUAR, the National Liberation Army (ELN) was inspired and financed in part by Havana. The ELN, initially the paramilitary arm of the Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (JMRL), has engaged in limited guerrilla action. It was responsible for the attack made in January 1965 on the town of Simacota in northeastern Colombia--an attack which may have been directly financed by Cuba, since the ELN leader, Fabio Vasquez, is known to have been in Havana in late 1964.

The short-lived United Front, established in 1964 by the renegade Catholic priest Camilo Torres Restrepo to promote revolutionary change in Colombia, also seems to have been largely inspired by the Cuban example. The United Front gained some popular support and hence received qualified endorsement from the PCC. However, Torres was killed when his guerrilla unit was engaged in action with Colombian military forces in early 1966. His activities received extensive eulogies from the Cuban propaganda machine, including special praise from Castro for his choice of the "path of revolution"; but there is no evidence that Cuba financed them.

FABIO VASQUEZ CASTANO

Leader of the ELN, the Cuban - supported National Liberation Army.

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ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP OF COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS

	1962	Mid-1966
Colombian Communist Party (PCC)	10,000*	8,000*
PCC-Marxist/Leninist	-	Less than 2,000 (2,000-2,500 in 1964)
Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC)	1,500	200-300
National Liberation Army (ELN)	-	100 active guerrillas
United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)	10,000	Inactive
Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (JMRL)	3,000	Inactive

Excludes youth auxiliary

The Split in the PCC

The major blow to the PCC came when the party split in early 1964 over the armed struggle issue and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The splinter party formed by the dissidents and expelled leaders called itself the PCC-Marxist-Leninist (PCC-ML), thus laying claim to the mantle of "true" Colombian Communism. This revolt cost the regular party prestige, the loss of a substantial number of members--including many party youth--and disruption in its national organization.

Although the PCC-ML attempted to proselytize among the pro-Castro revolutionary organizations,

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its inspiration and ideology were largely influenced by China. After the Havana Conference of Latin American parties in late 1964, at which Castro implicitly abandoned his "neutralism" in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the PCC-ML turned hostile toward the Cuban regime. It alleged that the Cuban leader had fallen prey to the "revisionists," and had transformed himself into an enemy of "the working class and the Chinese people...and hence of the Communist parties of the world."

Even the timing of the rift was tied to the debate over armed struggle. In one of its initial publications, the PCC-ML denounced the old guard central committee leaders for not adequately supporting a major bastion of Communist guerrilla strength in Marquetalia, after the government forces launched a sizable campaign there in May 1964 to eradicate subversion. The PCC-ML insisted that

> Marquetalia must be the beginning of the war of liberation in Colombia.... It is necessary to substitute the revolutionary principle of active guerrillas for the false and conservative principle of 'self-defense.' ...any peaceful method, as a principal form of taking power, is definitely out of the question in Colombia; parliamentary and legal resources, together with other forms of mass struggle, can only be used as secondary and complementary aspects of the principal form of struggle--the use of arms.... The national leadership [of the PCC] is mistaken in its policy....

The top leaders of the PCC closed ranks in the face of the party revolt, and admitted that the ideological roots of their problems "originated in the subjective concessions which the party has been making to those extremist tendencies of the so-called left." They denounced local extremists and openly accused Peking of being the inspiration and major cause of dissension within the party. But even though the split had come largely on the issue of the lucha

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SELECTED AREAS OF COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
JUNE 1966

ELN guerrillas in training

Colombian Army patrol in Communist guerrilla territory



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armada, of which Castro was the best known Latin American practitioner, the PCC leaders not only refrained from condemning the Castro regime for promoting revolutionary adventurism of the left, but actually praised the Cuban socialist experiment and its significance for the Communist movement in the hemisphere, although they were rather noncommittal when relating the Cuban revolution to the armed struggle in Colombia. This propaganda treatment of Cuba derived from the PCC leaders' consciousness of Castro's ties with Moscow and of his appeal to various leftist elements in Colombia rather than from any possible enthusiasm of their own for imitating his rise to power.

The PCC's extensive experience with guerrilla warfare and the phenomenon of rural violence (la violencia), and its involvement in various attempts to combine scattered guerrilla groups into a coordinated movement probably led to an awareness among the PCC leadership that Castro's guerrilla success was a product of unique conditions and circumstances rather than a universally applicable experience. The decimation of the resources of the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left was additional confirmation of its belief.

PCC antagonism toward the ultraleft promoters of the lucha armada was expressed frequently both before and after the party split. While the PCC-ML was slinging epithets at the old Guard, such as "Khrushchevist revisionists"--and raising Castro to the rank of "No. 1 Khrushchevist"--the PCC was denouncing the pro-Chinese as "anti-Soviet divisionists." The verbal conflict assumed some of the features of the Sino-Soviet dispute in a teapot, but was limited to the issue of armed struggle and particularly guerrilla warfare.

The 10th Congress of the PCC in early 1966 formally stigmatized the PCC-ML as "traitors who have deserted the great party and who pretend to carry out a revolution without a party, a revolution without Marxism-Leninism." A key resolution of the Congress stated:

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> The party must pursue its firm ideological struggle against the disastrous 'ultraleftist' tendencies, which are characterized by empty revolutionary phraseology without foundation in Colombian reality; against the dogmatic thesis that the via armada is the only form of struggle worthy of revolutionaries, accompanied in practice by passive opportunism before Yankee imperialism and its oligarchic-militarist instruments; against the depreciation of the just struggles for the worker masses and toward the political activities which can advance them in overt and legal form.

By Communist definition the "ultraleft" thus included not only the party traitors and defectors but the pro-Communist splinter groups seeking to launch the lucha armada. Occasionally, the PCC singled out specific names in its counterattacks against these groups, always reserving special invective for the apostate Communists who went to Peking in search of aid.

The renegade priest Camilo Torres was described more sympathetically by the PCC leadership, which, nevertheless, lamented his departure from the original parliamentary path of his United Front organization to join the lucha armada--a departure made without "consulting" the PCC. The sacrifice of his life in a guerrilla action "was a valiant and heroic deed, but this is not the principal form of struggle for the majority of the Colombian people."

Criticism of "ultraleftists," however, has been muted since early 1966 as the PCC has been making tentative efforts to collaborate with and gain control over the violence-prone ELN and MOEC. In retrospect, the Tenth Congress may have marked the beginning of a new PCC policy phase which will feature a somewhat greater emphasis on armed struggle without necessarily abandoning the over-all precepts of the via pacifica policy.

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III. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC

Varied foreign pressures on the PCC, when seen against the backdrop of domestic political factors, have also contributed to dissension in the party. The example of the Cuban revolution, in combination with tangible Cuban aid for programs of violence, stirred the splinter groups of the "ultraleft" to actions which opposed the efforts of orthodox PCC leaders to promote the mass struggle through a national patriotic front. These groups also found supplementary encouragement from Peking and, at least until the PCC split and the Havana Conference of Latin American Communist parties in 1964, the Cuban influence apparently acted as an indirect stimulus to the pro-Chinese hard-line elements within the PCC.

Castroism and the PCC

In many parts of Latin America the principal impact of the Cuban revolution was its provocative example for radical leftist elements. Colombia was a special case, ranking high on the Cuban priority list for external subversion, probably second on the South American continent only to Venezuela. Moreover, the experienced Colombian guerrilla bands of Communist and pro-Communist orientation undoubtedly made the target more attractive to the Cubans. Castro himself seemed to regard Colombia in a special way. He had been in the country at the time of the bloody Bogotazo of April, 1948 and was a personal friend of Gloria Gaitan, daughter of the leftist liberal leader Jorge Gaitan whose assassination had touched off the rioting. Yet it was probably Che Guevara, a principal architect of Cuban subversive policy in Latin America, who was largely responsible for Havana'a decision to circumvent the PCC and turn to the militant leftist groups to promote rural and urban violence in Colombia.

During the 1961-65 period, the MOEC, FUAR, ELN, and JMRL were the principal recipients of Cuban aid which was dispensed in a sporadic, poorly planned, and largely ineffective manner. Direct cash grants probably totaled less than $250,000 but political and guerrilla

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training, propaganda subsidies, and travel for members of these organizations probably cost Cuba several times that amount. In addition to tangible forms of aid, all of these groups were the beneficiaries of stimulation and guidance from Cuba; and sooner or later, all of them, with the possible exception of the ELN, fell out with the PCC over the latter's program of mass struggle.

The PCC was well aware of Cuban relations with the leftist groups in Colombia. Castro's cash grants to the FUAR, for example, were public secrets in Colombia, only the specific sums being in doubt. The PCC had good reason to resent this Cuban meddling deeply. As previously noted, Castro's aid went in many cases to men who had been expelled from the party. In addition, the PCC feared the government might charge it with complicity in the subversive activities of these Cuban-supported organizations and suspend its legal status.

Nevertheless, the PCC's public position toward Cuba, as expressed in party statements and propaganda, was invariably eulogistic after 1959. The Communist press in Colombia gave extensive coverage "in defense of" the Cuban revolution and government, called for solidarity with Havana against the "imperialists," praised Castro's achievement as an example in the construction of socialism, and even acknowledged that Cuban experience had been incorporated into the tactics of the "self-defense" guerrilla organizations in Colombia. The party probably spoke with greater sincerity in its repeated endorsements of the decisions taken at the Havana Conference, at which the Cubans agreed to curb their scattered subversive efforts in Latin America and coordinate their activities through orthodox Communist channels. The PCC gave similar unqualified approval to the Havana Tri-Continent Congress in early 1966 which called for active "solidarity" with Latin American revolutionary movements.

Despite such public praise, there nevertheless is reason to believe that the PCC was sharply critical and resentful of Castro's "extracurricular" subversive antics in Colombia. Top PCC leaders in early 1964, when discussing the problems arising from the ultra-leftist groups which followed the "Cuban and Chinese lines," reportedly stated that the "Guevara faction"

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in Cuba openly backed revolution in Latin America through groups other than the Communist parties. Pedro Abella of the MOEC and Luis Villar Borda of the JMRL, both ex-Communists, were pointed up as examples of ultra-left leaders who had used Cuban and Chinese aid to corrupt the Colombian Communist Youth. The PCC is reported to have sent a letter of protest on Abella's activities in Cuba and to have received a reply from the Cuban Communist Party promising appropriate action. At about the same time, the PCC--when answering a circular from the Brazilian Communists inquiring about attitudes on holding a Latin American Communist conference to discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute--stated that it approved such a meeting but not in Cuba. The PCC pointed out that participants in any meeting in Havana would be restricted in their discussion of "certain actions of Cuba" against other parties in the hemisphere.

The PCC had learned, apparently just before sending this letter to the Brazilian comrades, that Che Guevara had been disparaging its position and policies. In a meeting with a Colombian Communist delegation in Havana, also attended by ex-Communist Luis Villar Borda, Guevara reportedly had insisted that conditions were ripe for revolution in Latin America. He noted, however, that in many countries, including Colombia, the Communist Party was a hindrance to such a program; and he added that the PCC would lose popular support if it continued to act and think in a "passive" manner.

After the Havana Conference of Latin American parties, the Cuban regime apparently altered its subversive policies toward Colombia and conformed to its agreement to work through orthodox channels. The Cuban-financed Simacota incident which occurred in January 1965 seems to be an exception. It was probably too well advanced to be stopped by the Cuban regime. Meanwhile, the ultraleftist Colombian leaders are believed to have lost their Cuban subsidies and other support. The Colombian Communists and the Cuban leaders also probably reconciled some of their differences on armed struggle in Colombia and discussed a coordinated approach to this facet of the PCC program at the Tri-Continent Congress in Havana early in 1966.

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There is some evidence that the rapprochement was based, at least in part, on the PCC's greater willingness to support armed action in Colombia beginning possibly in late 1965. The Cuban Government has not abandoned its preference for the lucha armada in Colombia. In his anniversary address on 26 July 1966, Castro praised the Colombian guerrilla movement and indirectly berated the PCC leadership and its policies.

The extensive Cuban propaganda coverage on Colombia is almost entirely devoted to the Communist-influenced guerrilla bands and their activities. For example, Havana radio disseminated the decisions of the "Second Conference of the Southern Guerrilla Bloc," which was held "somewhere in the forest" in the spring of 1965.

For its part, the PCC has faithfully carried out the bargain reached at Havana in 1964, which required that the Latin American parties give ample expression of "solidarity" with the Cuban regime. However, solidarity is probably still defined by the party as it was when Secretary General Vieira wrote, in an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism in 1963,

> Our solidarity with Cuba can best be shown by propaganda and explanation and carrying out extensive work among the masses to explain the results of the Cuban revolution.

PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

The PCC has traditionally displayed an unconditional adherence to Moscow; hence, its early endorsement of the Soviet position in the dispute with China merely reflected historical consistency. The Colombian party's response included periodic homage to the Declarations of Moscow in 1957 and 1960, recognition of the CPSU as the "vanguard of the Communist and working class movement," and ample condemnation of the "divisionist Chinese leaders." The story is accurately and succinctly outlined in a TASS dispatch in early 1966, describing an interview between CPSU Central Committee Secretary Suslov and Colombian Secretary General Vieira: "Once again the complete unity of views of the CPSU and the PCC was affirmed on the problems examined."

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Vieira has long been regarded by the Kremlin as one of the most trustworthy of the Latin American Communist leaders. He has attended almost all CPSU congresses and other key international Communist meetings over the past several years, including the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist parties in late 1964 and the subsequent gathering in Moscow. He has made other special trips to the Soviet capital, presumably to coordinate PCC policy. For example, he was reportedly there in August 1964 at the time when the party had split and the pro-Chinese elements were organizing the PCC-ML. Other PCC leaders, such as the late Filiberto Barrero and Jose Cardona Hoyos, have also been held in high regard by the Kremlin.

In the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Colombian party held firmly to the Soviet line in contrast to the evasive "neutralism" of the generally pro-Soviet party in Venezuela. The PCC gave unqualified and regular praise to the CPSU as the vanguard of the international movement, the savior of world peace, the defender of peaceful coexistence, and the genuine fount of Marxism-Leninism. It just as consistently upbraided the "Chinese leaders" with such epithets as divisionists, schismatics, tools playing into the hands of the imperialist camp, exporters of artificial revolution, and Maoist deifiers.

The PCC's formal commitment to the CPSU side came at the 9th Congress in 1961 and was reiterated at the 10th Congress in early 1966. Similar resolutions reaffirming this position were adopted at various intervening plenums of the central committee. In addition, the party followed the Soviet lead at international meetings, such as those held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 and at the East German Party Congress in Berlin in 1963.

In return for the PCC's stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the CPSU has backed the PCC in such propaganda media as TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow, Pravda, and Izvestia. Ample space has also been allotted to the Colombian party in Problems of Peace and Socialism.

Vieira's speech at the 23rd CPSU Congress of March and April 1966 was well publicized. At that time, he lauded the CPSU as the builder of socialism and peaceful coexistence and the defender of "world peace." He

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then outlined the decisions of the 10th PCC Congress indicated that "a new and original revolutionary" path was opening up in Colombia, based on the use of all forms and methods of struggle of the masses, among them armed struggle. But he admitted that the struggle would be "long and arduous" and that the PCC "cannot conquer a still strong and cruel enemy with mere ultra-revolutionary phrases." Acknowledging the CPSU as "the vanguard detachment of the international movement," and "the glorious Cuban revolution as our greatest stimulus," he then denounced "the stubborn campaigns to downgrade the indestructible work of the Soviet power and the schismatic maneuvers against the Communist international movement."

Relations With Peking

The militant Chinese advocacy of wars of national liberation was an inspiration and moral comfort to the various elements both inside and outside the PCC who insisted on the armed struggle. After 1961 when the PCC had unequivocally sided with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the party's problems with the pro-Chinese elements began to multiply, particularly when the latter began to seek material aid and guidance from China. The attitude of the radicals within the party is clearly reflected in a letter to the central committee written by Carlos Arias, a former candidate member who had been expelled from the party in 1963 and was later a top leader of the PCC-ML. Arias denounced the party's arbitrary handling of

> The Sino-Soviet problem which you /the central committee/ had tried to conceal against all evidence;...the treason which you will commit by supporting nonrevolutionaries in the coming elections;....History will decide who and how many are to blame for delaying the Colombian revolution and who scourged the revolutionaries of the PCC. The people already know who insults the revolution and the Chinese leaders; who insults the revolution and the Cuban leaders; who refers to Venezuelan revolutionaries as

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adventurers; and who insults the real Colombian revolutionaries.*

Arias further noted that the central committee had not only expelled him from the party but, in the same session, had also "condemned Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese revolution. This is a splendid task which North American imperialists are probably applauding."

The Chinese sought to inspire the ultraleftist groups and the dissident elements within the PCC in an attempt to promote the armed revolution in Colombia and to undercut the policies and prestige of the orthodox party. Travel of pro-Chinese leaders to Peking was heavy and included representatives of the MOEC, FUAR, JMRL, and the PCC-ML. Pedro Abella, Luis Villar Borda, Leon Arboleda, Pedro Vasquez Rendon, Eduardo Aristizabal, and Manuel Manotas Manotas were among those who went to China during the years 1963-65 to present their plans to the Chinese and to obtain assistance and guidance. After the PCC-ML was formed in 1964, however, the Chinese apparently limited their paramilitary training, financial aid, and other support primarily to this organization and to the MOEC.

PEDRO VASQUEZ RENDON

A leading figure in the PCC-ML, the pro-Peking Communist splinter party.

China's aid to its sympathizers in Colombia seems to have been niggardly. Although some of the travelers to Peking may have received small cash grants, the one regular source of financing has been through the NCNA agency in Bogota. The amounts paid in salaries and for other services to the local Communist NCNA representatives are not believed to exceed $150 per month.

* *Emphasis added*

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Although the PCC attempted to prohibit the dissemination of Chinese propaganda in Colombia after 1963 and expelled the pro-Chinese NCNA employees from the party, the latter still retain their agency positions and apparently still receive the small monthly payments. There is some ground for considering the PCC-ML to be a poorly disciplined party, not in close touch with Peking, since its two factions have contended for control of the NCNA agency and the agency has remained independent of both.

Peking's promises to its sympathizers in Colombia for propaganda support, scholarships, paramilitary training, and other assistance have probably been far more lavish than the actual cash outlays. Peking has disseminated sporadic propaganda in support of the PCC-ML, branding the "orthodox" leaders "revisionists" and endorsing the "revolutionary struggle to seize power through a patriotic anti-imperialist popular revolution...." The Chinese have also financed guerrilla warfare training and "scholarship" programs, reportedly in North Korea and Vietnam as well as in China.

The PCC response to Chinese collaboration with its enemies has been sharp. Top central committee members, well aware of the travels to Peking of such "traitors" as Pedro Abella (and the purpose of such pilgrimages), are known to have discussed in early 1964 the pressures and problems which such activities were placing on the party. Besides trying to stop Chinese propaganda emanating from the NCNA office in Bogota, the PCC also attempted to stifle party discussion of the Chinese line and of Peking's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Chinese sympathizers were threatened with expulsion.

Whether Vieira and his colleagues exaggerated the Chinese responsibility for the PCC's internal problems is debatable, but they certainly sought to link the pro-Chinese dissidents with the "ultraleft charlatans" who insisted on immediate revolution in Colombia. Vieira wrote in 1965 that such groups had seized upon the false and misleading Chinese position to attack the PCC and its program.

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The PCC's general sensitivity to the effects of the party split was illustrated by its sharp response to a September 1964 article in El Tiempo, the leading daily of Bogota, which had described the expulsion of leaders from the party, the splits in regional Communist committees, and the disintegration of the PCC organization. In its rebuttal in Voz Proletaria, the party insisted that the great majority of members had remained loyal to the orthodox PCC, attacked "the methods of the Chinese leaders" and charged that the principal objective of the deviationist "ultrarevolutionaries" was to attack the PCC rather than the true enemies--"the reactionary national forces and Yankee imperialists."

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IV. ASSESSMENT

During the period under review (May 1957 - August 1966) the PCC managed to maintain its legal status and the unity of the old-line leaders headed by Vieira. It kept the party organization intact and retained the loyalty of the majority of the rank and file membership as well as its influence over traditional rural enclaves and the principal pro-Communist paramilitary leaders in the countryside. The close ties with the Soviet party were challenged only by a few defectors.

Balanced against these accomplishments, which were largely holding operations, are the substantial reverses to Communist strength and potential in comparison to the party's outlook as late as 1962. The program failed to prevent an internal split or to satisfy the demands of the radical leftist groups who were inclined to pursue the armed struggle.

During this period, foreign and domestic influences on the party were intertwined and, of course, reacted on each other. No firm conclusions are possible about their relative weights. Nevertheless, the developments rehearsed in this paper do suggest certain very tentative generalizations on how these influences have operated in the case of the Colombian party.

The PCC was run throughout this period by an old guard leadership whose own inclinations--particularly on the key issue of the armed struggle--seem to have accorded fairly well with the Moscow line; if Moscow had favored intensifying the armed struggle, there might have been some test of their allegiance. The party's formal split in 1964 over the Sino-Soviet dispute of course reflected its previous support of Moscow's side in international Communist meetings, as contrasted with the "neutralist" position taken by the Venezuelan Communist party; but it also probably reflected somewhat less flexibility in the PCC leadership at dealing with party dissension. The PCV,

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plagued with more serious internal conflict over the armed struggle issue, did stay together through 1965.

The Cuban influence on the PCC was indirect and in one sense more a domestic influence than a foreign one, in that it had a strong appeal (though, as time went on, a diminishing one) to the radical leftist opinion in Colombia, and Havana subsidized to some extent the splinter groups which competed with the PCC for leftist support. This situation was reflected in the PCC's attitude toward the Castro regime. The PCC split in 1964 came largely over the issue of the armed struggle, of which Fidel Castro was the hemisphere's leading exponent, but it was Peking that was publicly blamed by the PCC leadership; Cuba, both on that occasion and subsequently, was praised. Castro's known alignment with Moscow would of course have made it embarrassing for the PCC to be publicly critical of him, but his Moscow tie did not prevent the PCC from being critical of his regime in a 1964 communication to Brazilian Communists.

The extent of Peking's actual influence in Colombian Communist circles has been very small, despite the readiness of the proponents of the armed struggle to invoke Chinese ideological support.

Domestic, rather than foreign, factors seem to have been mainly responsible for the principal 1966 development in PCC policy: a reappraisal of party policy on the lucha armada in an apparent effort to recapture the leadership of the extreme left through more tangible support and guidance for the guerrilla forces. The propaganda facet of this modified policy appeared in the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress, which recognized that the armed struggle was the "principal form" in certain local areas and that guerrilla warfare had reached a "new stage" of development. It is similarly reflected in the PCC's formation in 1966 of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), a "general staff" for coordinating rural Communist subversion; the FARC has issued an open invitation to membership for all leftist guerrilla elements, active or in process of being organized. The reported Communist liaison with the ELN and the favorable Communist attitude toward this organization's

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guerrilla activity also suggest increased emphasis by the PCC on this aspect of its program. In addition, there is evidence of closer cooperation between the PCC and the Cuban regime since the Havana Conference in late 1964 and particularly since the Tri-Continent Congress in early 1966, as partly revealed in Cuban and Colombian propaganda and in the appointment of Central Committee member Manual Cepeda Vargas as permanent PCC representative in Havana.

The changes of early 1966 probably do not add up to a basic shift in the PCC's long adherence to the primacy of the via pacifica, but they do suggest a greater sensitivity to domestic pressures and possibly some increased tactical flexibility.

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ANNEX A

THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) AND THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCV): A COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCES SINCE 1958

	PCC	PCV
I. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS AND INFLUENCES		
Legal status	Party outlawed, 1954-57; regained legal status after ouster of dictator Rojas Pinilla, May 1957; retained legal status throughout period	Outlawed 1950-58; regained legal status after ouster of dictator Perez Jimenez, January 1958; the government suspended political activity of party and principal ally, Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), 1962.
Public and political status after overthrow of dictator	Little change from previous period; limited national influence; political atmosphere conservative compared to Venezuela; strong potential opportunity through cooperation with dissident Liberal faction, MRL, and other leftist groups	Highly favorable; party had considerable public credit for contributing to ouster of Perez Jimenez; strong leftist orientation of all political groups; united front in labor movement; potential close allies for PCV in factions of Democratic Action Party (AD) and Democratic Republican Union (URD)

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	PCC	PCV
Party program	Consistently emphasized primacy of via pacifica; rejected lucha armada as principal form for entire country; certain modifications to defend pro-Communist guerrilla forces	Via pacifica until 1962, with increasing use of violence; lucha armada became principal form after 1962; initial emphasis on urban violence; after 1963, emphasis on the "prolonged struggle" through guerrilla warfare
Program impact on top leadership	Central committee retained close-knit unity in support of via pacifica	Serious divisions over lucha armada; leaders shifted in attitude over the period, but no overt split; MIR ally split
Program results	PCC split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese organizations in 1964; running battle with other radical groups favoring lucha armada; split in youth auxiliary	Principal leaders imprisoned; party and MIR ally seriously divided internally and between themselves; party political assets sharply depleted; national organization disrupted.
Alliances	Informal cooperation with MRL for political and electoral action; MRL factionalism reduced effectiveness of front tactic after 1962	Marxist, pro-Castro MIR; pro-Castro elements of URD; sympathy or "solidarity" from other leftist elements.
Potential for conducting guerrilla war	Relatively strong; party had long experience with rural violence and guerrilla warfare, enclaves of rural support, and varying control over several active guerrilla leaders.	Negligible; peasant support limited; no trained leaders in guerrilla warfare and no experience with this form of subversion

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	PCC	PCV
II. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES		
Traditional orientation	Pro-Soviet	Pro-Soviet
Position on Sino-Soviet dispute	Unconditionally pro-Soviet from the outset; condemnation of Peking	Sought to avoid the issue under guise of neutralism; followed Cuban stand; refused to criticize the Chinese
Cuban impact	Disrupted PCC relations with the leftist groups favoring the lucha armada; contributed to dissension in the MRL	Strong, dominant, and direct; equally strong on MIR and other allies; probably largely determined the adoption of the lucha armada
Party relations and attitudes toward Cuba	Publicly eulogistic; privately resentful and critical	Close; party sensitive to Cuban views and guidance
Cuban aid	Ineffectual shotgun approach to radical leftists favoring guerrilla warfare and violence; a challenge to the PCC program of via pacifica; Cuban propaganda in part a criticism of party leaders	Substantial training, propaganda, and other aid; assistance granted PCV allies provoked no resentment in party
Chinese influence	Contributed to party split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese organizations in 1964; party blamed Chinese for its troubles with the ultra-left	Limited; PCV lucha armada program coincided with Peking revolutionary line, but Cuban example predominant

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	PCC	PCV
Chinese aid	Limited financial and training assistance to PCC-ML and to ultra-left leaders; Colombians often took initiative in seeking aid from Peking	Considerable solidarity and propaganda support; negligible financial assistance; some training and guidance
Party relations with Peking	Hostile	Friendly; occasional liaison
Party relations with Moscow	Party completely servile to Moscow throughout period; reciprocal approval from CPSU	Strained by Sino-Soviet dispute; steadily improving since Khrushchev's political demise in 1964 and Havana Conference of Latin American parties
PCC-PCV relations	Propaganda support for the PCV lucha armada and other difficulties; party concerned by the Venezuelan program; occasional liaison; some operational assistance	Party absorbed in its own problems and hence little cooperation with PCC; borrowed from Colombian "self-defense" theory to justify guerrilla warfare; radical MIR elements conducted liaison with pro-Chinese faction and other lucha armada leftists in Colombia

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March 1967

"Talking paper" for D/OCI regarding
Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian
Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966

1. This is a research paper: a kind of case study of the behavior of an important Latin American Communist party during a critical period.

2. It is parallel to an earlier intelligence study, Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Venezuelan Communist Party, 1958 - Mid-1965, published in December 1965,* which also dealt with the fortunes of a Communist Party in the years immediately following the removal of a right-wing dictatorship.

3. A number of the general conclusions reached in this paper on the Colombian party are similar to several in the study on the Venezuelan party, though the Colombian party was selected for examination in part because of contrasts in its recent history--e.g., it took a decided pro-Soviet line in the Sino-Soviet dispute, while the Venezuelan party took a neutral line; it suffered a pro-Peking split in 1964, while the Venezuelan party held together through 1965.

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4. Some of the paper's conclusions about the Colombian party are:

(a) The main policy conflict in the party was over the issue of guerrilla warfare vs. mass political action (via armada vs. via pacifica).

(b) Aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute obviously paralleled this conflict and the foreign influences on party policy were necessarily intertwined with the domestic, but it was the domestic factors which were generally controlling.

(c) The impact of the Cuban revolution on Colombian leftist opinion gave impetus to the party hard-liners' attack on the via pacifica policy.

5. It is recommended that this paper be given approximately the same distribution as the Venezuelan study--i.e., Category E, plus certain high-placed, named officials.

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

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